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G9IMINAL LAW COMMENTS
quate defense to a complicated felony charge, a plea of guilty is not
deemed a waiver anywhere.
3 7
It is apparent that the principal distinction between the safeguards
offered an accused under the Sixth Amendment and those established
under the Fourteenth Amendment have reference to non-capital cases
only.
The dissent in the principal case indicates that it would be advisable
to have a uniform rule requiring that the accused in all criminal cases
in state courts be advised of, and guaranteed a right to counsel, while
the majority is inclined to follow a more flexible rule whereby each
case is decided solely on the basis of whether tthe accused has had a
"fair hearing." There is much worth in both positions but it is sug-
gested that a more favorable rule would be that counsel be provided an
accused in all felony cases, whether regarded as capital or non-capital
crimes, when he is unable to procure counsel for himself because of
financial or mental incompetency. This would represent a compro-
mise between the two views expressed in the case, and yet offer a prac-
tical solution to a vexatious problem. The distinction between capital
and non-capital cases should be disposed of, inasmuch as a long peni-
tentiary sentence in a non-capital felony case can be as severe a punish-
ment as a judgment of death.
JOHN W. KEREIGAN
What Constitutes Double Jeopardy?
The principle that a person should not be punished more than once
for the same act is familiar to all nations.' At common law one accused
of a crime was protected from a second prosecution by pleas of former
acquittal or conviction. However, these pleas were not available unless
an actual verdict had been rendered at the first trial.2 In America
this principle has been characterized as a protection against double
jeopardy and incorporated into the federal and forty-one state consti-
tutions. Even in those states not having constitutional provisions the
common law rule is applied as one of the elements of due process of
law.3 Under the constitutional provisions, however, the scope of protec-
tion has been broadened to prohibit putting the accused to a second
87 Daliteerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1947). (A seventeen-year old boy was
indicted for murder, arraigned, convicted on his plea of guilty without counsel, and
sentenced to life imprisonment. Murder is a non-capital offense in Michigan. The
accused was not instructed regarding the assistance of counsel, nor did the court
apprise him of the consequences of his plea. Held to be a violation of due process.)
Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1944).
11 'The maxim non bis in idem (not twice in the same) belongs to the universal
law of nations". Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions (1932) 32 Col.
L. R. 1309, 1317.
2 See State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 Atl. 23 (1918), for discussion of the common
law rule.
3 Ibid. Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts and North Carolina are among those
states not having a constitutional provision against double jeopardy. In all of these
states the principle has been applied. Kneier, Prosecution Under State and Municipal
Ordinance as Double Jeopardy (1931) 16 Corn. L. Q. 201, 202 note 4.
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defense after jeopardy has once attached, whether or not a verdict was
rendered at the first trial.
4
Most of the constitutions provide that no person "shall be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense" or that no person "shall be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." 5 The
greatest perplexities in the application of these provisions have been
caused by the lack of certainty as to the definition of the seemingly sim-
ple term "same offense." In attempting to define this term, the courts
have devised certain technical rules and tests, fair perhaps in one case,
but often inadequate criteria vhen applied to different fact situations.
The two .double jeopardy problems which have caused the greatest con-
flict, and which have been most inadequately solved, have arisen where
the same act violates the laws of more than one sovereignty and where
more than one offense arises from the same act. In the first situation
the majority of courts have held that a prosecution by one sovereignty
will not bar prosecution by another, while in the second it is generally
held that there may be a prosecution for more than one offense if certain
requirements are met. The application of these two rules often seems
harsh and unjust, but much of the seeming harshness may be accounted
for By the fact that the state does not have a right to appeal, and by
the consequent effort of the courts to compensate the state for this dis-
advantage. This comment will be limited in its scope to a consideration
of these problems.
Prosecutions in More Than One Jurisdiction
Since the same act may constitute an offense against both federal and
state laws, the question arises as to whether an acquittal or conviction
in one jurisdiction will bar a subsequent prosecution in the other. In
the earlier decisions the courts held the view that federal law superseded
any state law relating to the same subject.6 Under this view there was
no question of a second prosecution for the same act since the federal
government assumed sole jurisdiction over acts denounced as criminal
by both state and federal law. However, in 1847 this ruling wad abro-
gated by the decision in Fox v. Ohio,7 in which the United States Su-
preme Court held that federal legislation against the passing of counter-
feit coin did not deprive the state of its power to punish for the offense.8
With the development of this theory it became apparent that successive
prosecutions might become a reality. Although there were several hold-
ings to this effect in the earlier cases, the Lanza case 9 decided in 1922,
definitely established this "rule of successive prosecutions," that one
4 Jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn in, or, if the trial is
by the court, when the court has begun to hear evidence. Exceptions: where there
is error. Barber v. State, 151 Ala. 56, 48 So. 808 (1907) (Conviction under a void,
statute) ; State v. Scott, 99 Iowa 36, 68 N. W. 45 (1896). (Invalid or defective in-
dictment) or where the jury were unable to reach a verdict. Dreyer v. People, 188 Iln.
40, 58 N. E. 620 (1900).
5 Ill. Const. Art. 2 § 10, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945).
6 See Jett v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. 869, 877 (1867), for a discussion of the earlier
cases.
7 46 U. S. 410 (1847).
8 See also United States v. Marigold, 50 U. S. 56 (1850); Moore v. People of
Illinois, 55 U. S. 13 (1852).
9 United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922).
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act constituting a crime against both national and state sovereignties
could be punished by both.' 0 The reasoning behind this rule is that
an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties
is an offense against the peace and dignity of each and therefore may
be punished by each; that, although the acts punished are identical,
the offense is not the same. This "rule of successive prosecutions"
reached maturity during the struggle with the problems arising under
the prohibition laws. The courts, confronted with a multitude of cases
concerning the transportation and sale of liquor, ignored the earlier
decisions dealing with similar problems of concurrent jurisdiction."
It has been a long established principle that the Bill of Rights was
attached to the Constitution to secure to the people of this country the
common law rights of Englishmen. Having had no previous experience
with a federal system, those men who drew up the constitution clearly
could not have anticipated the potential power of the state governments.
Therefore, the Bill of Rights was directed solely at the central govern-
ment as the source of power with which they were familiar. To prevent
an abusive use of such power those rights were guaranteed. To deter-
mine what those rights were in relation to this doctrine it is necessary
to consider the scope of the common law plea of a previous acquittal
(autrefois acquit). In England as early as 1662 the plea of a pre-
vious acquittal upon a criminal charge in Wales was held a bar to a
subsequent prosecution in England.' 2 In fact, such extensive effect
was given to this doctrine that in R. v. Hutchinson, England recognized
a murder acquittal under Portuguese law.'8 The argument might be
made that the situation of dual citizenship existing in the United States
creates a problem different from that known at common law and to
the law of nations, since under our federal system each resident is sub-
ject to both federal and state law. However, such reasoning is evasive
when considered in the light of the real purpose of the double jeopardy
doctrine. This principle, by whatever name it is called, has always been
considered as a protection of human right as opposed to sovereignty.
Under the older penal laws, including early common law, a common
mode of punishment was dismemberment. Was an accused to give two
arms in payment for a crime for which the punishment prescribed was
the loss of one arm?., The principle was that the guilty person should
lose one arm, not that each sovereignty offended should thus demand
an arm in payment.' 4 To prevent such violation of human right a
second prosecution was forbidden. It is to be assumed that the framers
of our constitution were informed as to the history of this principle,
lo United States v. Palan, 167 Fed. 991 (S. D. N. Y. 1909); United States v.
Casey, 247 Fed. 362 (S. . Ohio 1918); United States v. Holt, 270 Fed. 639 (W. D.
N. D. 1921); McCarty v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 287, 254 S. W. 887 (1933).
11 Prior to the development of this rule the courts had held that where two
sovereignties had concurrent jurisdiction either might prosecute, but the first prose-
cution was a bar to the subsequent prosecution by the other. Nielson v. Oregon, 212
U. S. 315' (1909) (treating concurrent criminal jurisdiction of Oregon and Wash-
ington on the Columbia River); Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U. S. 573 (1904); Houston
v. Moore, 18 U. S. 1 (1820).
12 R. v. Thomas, 1 Sid. 179, 1 Lev. 118 (1662). See Grant, cited supra note 1, for
development of the common law rule.
13 Not recorded but discussed in R. v. Thomas, cited supra note 12.




and were likewise interested in guaranteeing such protection to the
individual. Indeed, from the terminology used it would appear that
their intention was to extend the principle rather than restrict it as has
been done by the Lanza case. Viewed in the light of history and the
great care taken to restrict sovereignty by our Constitution it seems
apparent that the Lanza rule violates the spirit of the provision if not
the letter. The application of this rule has encouraged much abuse,
being used principally as "an easy way for prosecutors to make a record
for convictions with a minimum of effort,"' 5 and a means of evading
the constitutional provisions against compulsory self-incrimination and
illegal searches and seizures. 16 An interpretation that effects so much
injustice and is so conflicting with the spirit of the constitutional guar-
antee should be revised or abrogated. The position of the courts apply-
ing the rule of successive prosecutions is strengthened by the general
acceptance of the construction that the Bill of Rights affects the Federal
government only. In the recent Supreme Court case Adamson v. People
of California this interpretation of the federal constitution was force-
fully attacked by dissenting' Justices Black, Murphy, Douglas, and
Rutledge. 17 It is the theory of these Justices that the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment makes effective the specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights as a protection against state action.' 8 Such a trans-
formation of the double jeopardy provision into terms of due process
would be added argument against a second prosecution for the same
offense by any power whatever.
What little justification that can be made to support the "rule of
successive prosecutions" on the basis of the double coverage of state
and federal laws, is completely absent in the case of successive prose-
cutions by other political units. However, it has been extended to
encompass successive prosecutions by state-state, state-city and state-
county.
Although this problem was not before the court in State v. Shimman,19
there is dictum to the effect that continuous transportation of liquor
over the boundary of several states would be punishable in each state
if the law of each state prohibited it. There is some division of opinion
in reported cases when an act involves a violation of a state law and a
municipal ordinance. The more just as well as more logical view held
by a few courts is that because the municipality is but an agent of the
state and acting under delegated authority, a prosecution under a
municipal ordinance and a state statute would constitute a double prose-
cution within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.2 0 Under
this view the violation is held to constitute but one offense as well as
one act. However, the majority view is in line with the Lanza rule, and
holds that an act forbidden by both city and state is an offense against
15 Pound, Co-operation in Enforcement of Law (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 9, 14.
16 See also People v. Flaherty, 396 Ill. 304, 71 N. E. (2d) 779 (1947).
17 ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947).
18 In the Adamson ease, s upra note 17, Mr. Justice Black asserts that the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment "conclusively demonstrates that the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment ... was thought by those responsible for its submission
to the people, and those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to guarantee
that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and immunities
of the Bill of Rights."
19 122 Ohio St. 522, 172 N. E. 367 (1930).
20 See Kneier, cited supra note 3.
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the peace and dignity of each and therefore constitutes two distinct
offenses. Under this view a prosecution under one will not bar prosecu-
tion under the second.2 1
The most ridiculous lengths to which the theory of successive prosecu-
tions have been extended are those cases of prosecution by two counties.
In Lunsford v. State,22 it was held that operating a lottery in several
counties constituted a separate and complete offense in each county.23
The more logical approach to this problem is that of the court in State v.
Shimman,24 where an illegal act of transporting liquor continued through
several counties within one state was held to be a single offense and pun-
ishable in either county but not in both. This appears to be a sounder
view since the county is but a unit of venue for prosecuting an offense
against the state.24
Prosecutions for More Than One Offense Arising from the Same Act
The constitutional provisions against double jeopardy usually pro-
hibit a second prosecution for the "same offense." In attempting to
reach a standard definition that would be satisfactorily applicable to
all fact situations the courts have evolved a series of tests. The test
adopted by a majority of the courts and often most harsh in its appli-
cation is the same evidence test.25 The rule has been stated in various
ways by the courts. In general, however, the theory is that if the de-
fendant upon the first indictment could not have been convicted of the
offense described in the second, then an acquittal or conviction upon the
former is no bar to the latter. A test rarely applied, but extremely
favorable to the accused is the single intent test. Courts following this
rule hold that where there is but a single intent there is but a single
offense regardless of the number or severity of the results of the de-
fendants' acts.26 The third test, the same transaction test, recognizes
21 Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550 (1924) (the court held
that one who, in violating an anti-picketing ordinance, at the same time violated a
state law could be prosecuted under both); Hankins v. People, 106 Ill. 628 (1883)
(A grant of power to the city to punish for misdemeanors committed within its limits
is not a surrender of power of the state to punish for the same offense) ; Robbins v.
People, 95 Ill. 175 (1880) (conviction under a city ordinance prohibiting the keeping
of a gaming house no bar to a subsequent prosecution under state statute).
22 60 Ga. App. 537, 4 S. E. (2d) 112 (1938); Hall v. State, 73 Ga. App. 616,
37 S. E. (2d) 545 (1946) (conviction for speeding continuously through two counties
held subject to conviction in both).
23 (Note) 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1946).
2 4 
Op. cit. supra note 19.
25 Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 East. P. C. 519 (1796) (principle first stated); Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932) (Where the same act constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one is whether either provision requires proof
of fact which the other does not); Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 299 (1938) (Where
successive cuttings of different mailbags involved-held proof of cutting one would
not have supported the counts as to the other sacks, therefore separate crimes).
"The true test is whether evidence necessary to support the second indictment would
have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first." Archibald, Criminal
Pleadings (1846) 106. Contra, Robinson v. United States, 143 P. (2d) 276 (C. C. A.
10th, 1944). See also 3 Greenleaf, Evidence (1853) § 36 and 1 Bishop, Criminal Law
(9th ed. 1923) § 1052 for statements of the rule.
26 Hurst v. State, 24 Ala. App. 47, 129 So. 714 (1930); Burnam v. State, 2 Ga.
App. 395, 58 S. E. 683 (1907).
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that when both offenses are part of the same criminal transaction, and
no human act or agency separates the two offenses, they are the same.
27
The fallacy in this method of approach is that the protection against
double jeopardy is a substantive right that cannot be confined within
the narrow limits of purely technical rules. Such a test may reach a
fair result in one situation but is often unjust when applied to a dif-
ferent fact situation.
In the recent case People v. Harrison28 the Illinois Supreme Court
relied upon the same evidence test with little attempt at justification.
The defendant was first acquitted on an indictment for the offense of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder. Fol-
lowing an acquittal of accused, the victim died and defendant was
thereafter tried and convicted of murder. The conviction was affirmed
by the Illinois Supreme Court. Had the Illinois court in the Harrison
case applied either of the other available tests the result would have
been otherwise. For example, if the court had analyzed the case on
the basis of the rule that when there is but a single intent there is but
a single offense, the conviction could not have been upheld. Logically
it is difficult to understand how one can be innocent of intent or implied
intent to commit murder and at the same time, as a result of the same
act, have the malice which is necessary to constitute the crime of murder.
It is equally apparent that the court would have reached a different
decision if it had applied the same transaction test. There was no
new act on the part of the defendant and no intervening agent. Clearly
the death of the victim resulted from the same transaction or act for
which the accused was acquitted at the first trial. There was no new
evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt. It would seem that the
prosecutor and trial judge felt that the first trial was not a fair one,
that the defendant was actually guilty of the first offense. This would
indicate that the enormity of the offense constitutes one factor in de-
termining which test is to be applied.
It would appear from the regularity with which the trial court's
determination is affirmed, that the trial judge is left relatively free
to apply the test which appears to him to bring about a just result.
The tests are so intangible that it is sometimes difficult to discover
which test the court is following. In United States v. St. Clair29 the
court held that where violation of the White-Slave Traffic Act involves
the transportation of more than one woman on the same trip and in
the same vehicle, the transportation of each woman constitutes a sep-
arate and distinct offense. The rationale of the case was that evidence
of defendant's intention as to one woman was no proof of his intention
as to another. Although the court spoke in terms of same evidence
it is not clear that the single intent test was not relied upon. The
application of the same transaction test would clearly have brought
about a different result.
The chief advantage of the same transaction rule is that it demands
a more efficient prosecution at the first trial. The careless and in-
27 Gunter v. State, 111 Ala, 23, 20 So. 632 (1895); Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Cr.
App. 118, 203 S. W. 357 (1918).-
28 395 Ill. 463, 70 N. E. (2d) 596 (1946). For a discussion of the Harrison case,
see Note 47 Col. L. Rev. 679-681 (1936).
29 62 F. Supp. 795 (W. D. Va. 1945); See also Gillenwater v. Biddle, 18 F. (2d)
206 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
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efficient prosecutor may not cover his mistakes by repeatedly compelling
the defendant to stand charges until a conviction is finally obtained.
The operation of this rule and its advantages may be strikingly observed
by comparing two cases with similar fact situations. In both cases the
charge was manslaughter resulting from the alleged negligent and
reckless driving of the defendant. In State v. Wheeloch3 ° three people
were killed through the negligence of defendant and the Iowa court,
applying the test, held that an acquittal of the defendant on a charge
of manslaughter of one victim was a bar to subsequent prosecutions
for the manslaughter of the others. In People v. Allen,3 ' defendant
simultaneously struck and killed two pedestrians. The accused was
set at liberty following an indictment for the manslaughter of one
victim under an Illinois statute providing for the discharge for fail-
ure to prosecute within four months. Accused was subsequently in-
dicted and convicted of the manslaughter of victim number two. The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the basis that there
were as many offenses as there were deaths. In cases like this the
courts have difficulty circumventing the fact the same evidence may be
used to prove both offenses. However, as may be seen from the Allen
case, they avoid this by placing the emphasis upon the name of the
person injured or killed. The dissenting opinion in the Allen case
indicates how unjust such an approach can be. The gist of the case
in situations like the above is, was or was not the defendant grossly
negligent? If he was, under Illinois law,3 2 he is guilty of manslaughter
if death is occasioned thereby. Although no great injustice was done
the defendant in this 'particular case, since a more or less technical
oversight accounted for the dismissal on the first manslaughter charge,
the practical result of the Illinois view as set out in the Allen case is
that the defendant may be repeatedly compelled to stand trial on this
one point though jury after jury might find that he had not been guilty
of gross negligence. Clearly the double jeopardy provision was intended
to protect the accused from being forced to such continuous defense
as this.
Another series of troublesome cases are those involving more than
one category of crime arising from the same transaction. In People v.
Bain33 the defendant was first prosecuted for burglary and was then
tried and convicted of robbery resulting from the same transaction.
The California Court, although committed to the same transaction test,
held that the previous prosecution was no bar to the latter. The rea-
soning of the court was that the burglary was complete when felonious
entry into the house was effected and the robbery was a second and
later transaction. This case and others like it indicates how far the
trial courts may stray from the rule they are purportedly following
and be upheld on appeal. 34 The Illinois Supreme Court was faced
30 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N. W. 617 (1933).
31368 Ill. 368, 14 N. E. (2d) 397, cert. denied 308 U. S. 511 (1938).
32 lI. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, § 363.
33 75 Cal. App. 109, 241 Pac. 913 (1925).
34 State v. Melia, 231 Iowa 332, 1 N. W. (2d) 230 (1941) (Defendant shot his
brother and his brother's wife who rushed in front of her husband, Held acquittal
of the murder of one on grounds of justifiable self defense did not bar prosecution
for the secoud-two deaths from a series of acts).
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with a similar problem in the recent case of People v. Loftus. 35 The
defendant, who has been tried and convicted on indictments for two
robberies, was subsequently tried and convicted on indictments for
burglary and larceny arising out of the same two fact situation. In
affirming the four convictions the court reaffirmed its adherance to the
same evidence test, that if the defendant upon the first indictment could
not have been convicted of the offense described in the second, then an
acquittal or conviction upon the former would be no bar to the latter.
36
Whether the acts be called a single offense or not it is clear that to
allow the state several chances at conviction in cases like the above
is to violate the spirit of the constitutional provision against double
jeopardy.
Another confusing set of cases are those involving two offenses which
are degrees of the same crime. The first group of cases to be consid-
ered are those in which the court, having jurisdiction of both offenses,
elects first to prosecute for the greater offense. May it later prosecute
for the lesser offense? In the Harrison37 case the court stated that
an acquittal of a defendant on an indictment for an offense which in-
cludes lesser offenses operates also as an acquittal of all included lesser
offenses of which he might have been convicted on the first indictment.
To constitute a "lesser offense" within the meaning of this definition,
the courts have universally held that the lesser must be an element or
degree of the greater, and arising from the same criminal act. As an
example of this the courts have held that an acquittal on an indictment
charging murder is a bar to a subsequent indictment for assault with
intent to commit murder.38 The problems involved in the application
of this rule arise from the necessity of determining exactly when an
offense is actually an element of a greater offense. In attempting to
resolve this difficulty the courts are faced with many of the same prob-
lems that are involved in determining whether there are actually two
offenses.
The problems here are not so great, however, as they are in the
reverse situation where the state elects first to prosecute for the lesser
of two offenses arising from the same incident. The rule allegedly
followed is that there may not be a second prosecution if the smaller
offense is a degree of the greater, or if the state could have prosecuted
for the greater offense in the first indictment.39 That an acquittal
or conviction of an offense included in a greater offense bars a sub-
sequent prosecution for the greater was upheld in the California case,
People v. Krupa.4 0 The defendant was first prosecuted under the sec-
ond count of an indictment for contributing to the delinquency of a
minor by having a minor transport narcotics, an act constituting a
misdemeanor.4 1 The California court held that this prosecution was a
35 395 Ill. 479, 70 N. E. (2d) 573 (1946).
36 See also People v. Flaherty, cited supra note 16.
37 395 Ill. 463, 70 N. B. (2d) 596 (1946).
38 People v. Dugas, 310 Ill. 291, 141 N. E. 169 (1923); Gilpin v. Maryland, 142
Md. 464, 121 Atl. 354 (1923). For discussion see Comment (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 462.
39 People v. Moore, 276 Ill. 392, 114 N. E. 906 (1917). (Where a verdict of guilty
of an assault with intent to commit rape was regarded as an acquittal of the greater
offense of rape).
40 64 Cal. App. (2d) 592, 149 P. (2d) 416 (1944).
41 Calif. Welfare Insts. Code (1937) § 702.
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bar to a subsequent prosecution under another statute making it a
felony for anyone to hire or employ a minor in transporting narcotics 4 2 .
In cases of prosecutions for murder following acquittal or conviction
of assault with intent to murder, the former has been held not to be
a bar even though it may be considered a degree of the same crime.
The rationale of this practice is that the additional element of death
constitutes a separate and distinct crime for which defendant could
not have been prosecuted under the first indictment.43 The reason
for the distinction in the case of murder is clearly drawn in the Harri-
son case, where the death of the victim did not occur until the accused
had been acquitted on the charge of assault with intent to murder.
44
It would have been impossible for the state to have prosecuted for
murder in the first indictment since at that time the crime of murder
did not exist.
Although the same evidence test is considered the majority rule in
dealing with the problem of two offenses arising from the same act,
there is considerable diversity of definitions even in those courts pur-
portedly following this rule.4 5 New Jersey alone has consistently
adhered to the same transaction test.46 In view of the conflicting deci-
sions and the uniformity of affirmance on appeal it appears that the
real decision is left to the discretion of the trial judge. Since the major-
ity of eases involving these problems are cases in which the accused
was acquitted at the first trial47 it would seem that the prosecutor and
trial judge are in effect deciding whether a fair trial was had in the
first prosecution.
As a practical result the offender is rarely subjected to a second
punishment. Even when a second trial is allowed the court often
resorts to such considerations of public policy as the seriousness of
the offense, the penalty involved, and the past record of the offender
in setting the sentence.48 However, it would seem that the purpose
of the double jeopardy provision is not served by placing the accused
at the mercy of the trial court no matter how fair minded the court
may be. There are many reasons for the conflicting interpretations
placed on the double jeopardy provisions. However, the most im-
portant and perhaps the one most easily corrected is the fact that
the state has not been given the right of appeal in most jurisdictions.
Since it is impossible for the state to correct errors that may have
prevented a fair trial on the first indictment, it is a logical result that
the courts have resorted to a loose construction of the double jeopardy
safeguards. In this way it has been made possible for the state to do
indirectly what it could not do directly. However, it has been done
with the previously mentioned accompanying evils.
42 Calif. Health and Safety Code § 1174 (1939).
43 People v. Dugas, 310 Ill. 291, 141 N. E. 169 (1923).
44 Cited supra note 37. For discussion see Comment cited supra note 38.
45 Compare Medlock v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 718, 720, 288 S. W. 670, 671
(1926); State v. McGaughey, 45 S. D. 379, 383, 187 N. W. 717, 718 (1922); Com-
monwealth v. Crowley, 257 Mass. 590, 595, 154 N. E. 326, 328 (1926).
46 State v. Mowser, 92 N. J. L. 474, 106 Atl. 416 (1919); State v. Cosgrove, 103
N. J. L. 412, 135 Atl. 871 (1927). The same transaction test has been applied,
though not consistently in Alabama, Oklahoma, and Texas. Comment (1931) 40
Yale L. J. 462.
47 See comment cited supra note 46.
48 See case cited note 37 supra.
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Right of the State to Appeal
Since the state was allowed no appeal at common law, no such right
will ever be implied in the absence of statute. In most jurisdictions
the right of the state to unqualified appeal is considered repugnant to
the double jeopardy provisions contained in the state constitutions,4 9
the theory being that when judgment is rendered the first jeopardy
ends, the accused is free and any further proceedings would in
effect constitute a second prosecution. In a few states, although an
absolute right of appeal by the state is regarded as being inconsistent
with the double jeopardy provision, appeals have been allowed but
review limited to determination of questions of law not affecting the
verdict.50 This is to provide a method whereby the law officers of the
state may receive the opinion of an Appellate Court upon questions
which they consider important to a correct administration of the crim-
inal law, and a basis for future action.
There are a few states allowing appeal where the offense charged
is a misdemeanor. In these states a new trial may be allowed upon re-
versal, notwithstanding a former judgment of acquittal. 51  Other juris-
dictions limit the state's right to appeal by allowing an appeal only
when jeopardy has not attached as for example, in appeals from a trial
court order quashing an indictment.
52
The more logical view seems to be that the same fundamental prin-
ciple of justice which allows a re-trial because a juror has been legally
disqualified, should allow a re-trial when an error has been committed
at the trial, such as, the admission of illegal evidence or the exclusion
of legal evidence. 58 There are a few states following this thesis in which
statutes conferring an absolute right of appeal by the state have been
upheld." However, in no case has such a statute been held valid in
states having constitutional provisions against double jeopardy. It
seems possible to avoid the conflict of these principles by accepting the
view that jeopardy is a continuing jeopardy from the beginning of the
case until a fair trial on the merits has been obtained on both sides. 55
In Palko v. Connecticut5H the defendant was convicted of murder in
the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. Pursuant to a
49 People v. Miner, 144 Ill. 308, 33 N. E. 40 (1893) (An acquittal bars the prose,
cation of a writ of error by the state in a criminal case whether felony or mis,
demeanor.) People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467 (1869) (Statute purporting to give right of
appeal to People in criminal cases held to be limited to cases in which errors in pro-
ceedings occur before jeopardy attaches); Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100
(1904) (appeal by United States held inconsistent with double jeopardy provision
of Federal Constitution).
50 State v. Gray, 71 Old. Cr. 309, 111 P. (2d) 514 (1941) ; State v. Dulany, 87 Ark.
17, 112 S. W. 158 (1908).
51 Commonwealth v. Abell, 275 Ky. 802, 122 S. W. (2d) 757 (1938).
52 Where a demurrer to an indictment has been sustained, appeal has been allowed.
Commonwealth v. Church, 1 P. St. 105, 44 Am. Dec. 112 (1845); United States v.
Keitel, 211 U. S. 370 (1908) (Appeal allowed under the Criminal Appeal Act of
1907 when a discharge had been had on a motion to quash).
53 State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1895).
54 State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 Atl. 23 (1918).
55 This view was ably expressed by Justice Holmes in the minority opinion in
Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 134 (1904).
56 302 U. S. 319 (1937). This statute had been previously upheld in State v. Lee,




statutory appeal taken by the state a new trial was granted. On the
second trial, under the same indictment the defendant was convicted
of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. This conviction
was sustained by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that
appeal by the state was not a violation of due process of law. The
kind of jeopardy to which the accused was subjected by the statute was
not a hardship so acute and shocking as to "violate those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions." Since the double jeopardy provision of
the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is not incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment so as to apply to state action, it is thus
limited in its operation to federal criminal procedure.5 7
Summary
There are several possible suggestions for clearing up the confusion
concerning the application of the double jeopardy provision. How-
ever, before justice can be fully effected by any of these changes the
state must be guaranteed one complete trial on the merits, free from
error. The only way to insure this is to allow the state the right to
appeal in criminal cases. A law granting such right would not violate
the guarantee against double jeopardy if the duration of jeopardy is
properly conceived. That the first jeopardy continues through appeal
in cases where there is error at the first trial is not a new concept, 58
nor is it lacking in authoritative support today.59 The accused is pro-
tected against illegal search and seizure, compulsory self-incrimination,
double jeopardy, and has the right of appeal. In view of these and
other safeguards it does not seem unreasonable that the state should
be allowed one fair trial. If, as a corollary to such a law, the scope
of protection offered by the double jeopardy provision is extended,
the accused would also be more sure of obtaining his constitutional
rights. If the reluctance of the courts to give a broad coverage to the
double jeopardy provision is partially due to feeling that the state
may not otherwise get a fair trial, granting the state the right of appeal
would remove the basis for this attitude.
To remove the oppression of the rule of successive prosecutions there
are several possibilities open. The courts could return to the earlier
view that federal legislation supersedes state law relating to the same
subject.60 Another possibility would be to allow either to prosecute
but hold the first prosecution a bar to a second. This view is also sup-
ported by earlier cases, especially in regard to the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of the states.61 The possibility that the offender might submit
himself to state process to avoid the heavier penalty sometimes imposed
by the federal law might be avoided by allowing an exception in such
cases. Where the penalty is heavier under federal law and the state
convicts first a trial might be allowed under federal law also, with
57 The United States may now take an appeal in criminal cases when defendant
has not been put in jeopardy, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907) 18 U. S. C. A. § 682 (1927).
58 See dissenting opinion, Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 134 (1904).
59 The American Law Institute has adopted a position allowing appeal by state
whenever material error has occurred at trial, American Law Institute, Administra-
tion of the Criminal Law, Official Draft (August 15, 1935) p. 13, § 13-14.
60 See note 6 supra.
61 See note 11 supra.
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sentences to run concurrently. The rationale of such an exception
would be that the accused was not actually in jeopardy to the extent
provided by the federal law at the first trial.
If the state had the right of appeal it would no longer be necessary
for the court to define the "same offense" in such a way as to give the
state another chance to prosecute because of error favoring the accused
at the first trial. The state should then find it necessary to include in
one indictment all offenses arising from one transaction which could
be joined. The fact that such a rule will force the state to "throw the
book" at the accused at the first trial will be offset by the assurance
that having once proved his innocence he cannot again be forced to
defend. Such a rule is directed at protecting the innocent rather than
the guilty. The failure of the state to get a conviction would no longer
be due to its inability to get a fair trial.
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